West Bengal Political Science Review | Vol. XXVIII, 2026 | ISSN: 2230-8296

---

Abstract

The study analyses the impact of political ideology and political narratives on welfare policies across Indian states, with particular emphasis on West Bengal’s post-2011 transformation. It concludes that the West Bengal transformation in welfare governance is political in nature and does not signify a complete ideological shift. The Left Front (1977-2011) framed welfare with a class Marxist approach, focusing on agrarian reforms and decentralised governance. The post-2011 period saw a change as the Trinamool Congress (TMC) adopted a different welfare approach, that is more targeted cash transfers and services framed in a populist and cultural narrative with Kanyashree and Lakshmir Bhandar. The new model is not cast in an ideology but in leadership populism and identity politics. Using a qualitative comparative approach, placing West Bengal with Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Gujarat, the analysis demonstrates that the state’s prevailing political narrative determines the welfare regime in the state: redistribution with caste-based justice in Tamil Nadu; participatory social investment in Kerala; and infrastructure-based growth in Gujarat. The shift in West Bengal’s welfare paradigm under Mamata Banerjee has increased electoral support but remains fragmented ideologically.

Keywords: Welfare politics, ideology, West Bengal, populism, redistribution, comparative state politics

1. Introduction

The welfare policies provided by the Indian states have become the primary focal points for the political legitimacy of governing parties. Numerous successive social welfare policies have been initiated by different governments to target the rural poor for political patronage, including reforms in rural land distribution and employment, subsidised food, and health and education initiatives. While most policy analysts attempt to make sense of the policies based on available budgets and the institutional capacity to implement them, the author argues that the welfare regime solely rests on the ideological and political rationales of the governing parties. Each political/ideological rationality creates a different welfare paradigm, which is a distinct and all-encompassing set of policy instruments, relations between the state and the citizen, and justification narratives.

West Bengal exemplifies this shift in ideology. From 1977 to 2011, the state was run by the Left Front coalition, with the CPI(M) using a Marxist-inspired ideology. The first years were dominated by extreme policies like radical agrarian reform, which secured sharecroppers’ rights with an initiative called Operation Barga, redistributing and empowering the landless, and constructing a notable Panchayati Raj system, which is a system of local self-government in the Indian states. These policies were noted as class-based land redistribution and political empowerment of peasants. In 2011, with the removal of the Left Front by Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress (TMC), new welfare initiatives were introduced along with cash transfers, subsidised and targeted schemes offered to women, students, and minority groups. These targeted initiatives are framed in a Marxist disnarrative, in lieu of left populist discourses, and declensions of identity politics with the Kanyashree scheme as an instrument of women’s empowerment and a culturally proud initiative aligned with the community’s festivals.

This shift raises the core question of this article – How can we understand the change in West Bengal’s welfare policy as ideological or political transformation? Does it represent a true ideological transition, or mainly a change in political calculus and language of welfare delivery? We examine whether West Bengal’s welfare “twin shock” – from Left Marxist redistribution to Trinamool populist welfare – signifies a durable change in the state’s ideological foundation.

To answer this, we adopt a comparative perspective. First, we carefully define our key concepts of “ideology” and “welfare paradigm”. Then we review relevant literature on Indian welfare politics. Our method is qualitative and interpretive – we analyse government policies, party manifestos, speeches, budgets, and secondary studies to trace the ideas behind welfare reforms. The main case examines West Bengal’s Left Front era reforms and the subsequent TMC era, highlighting ideological framings. We then compare with three contrastive state examples – Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Gujarat, each embodying a different political tradition and welfare model.

The central argument is that West Bengal’s welfare transformation is best understood as a shift from one welfare paradigm to another, rather than a pure ideological revolution. Under the Left Front, welfare was embedded in a class-based redistributive narrative. Under the TMC, welfare is embedded in a populist and culturally-inflected narrative. The new model draws on ethnic-cultural symbols and personal politics rather than systematic ideology. Our analysis will show that this shift affects how policies are designed and justified, and the kinds of legitimacy they confer.

We conclude that while West Bengal’s welfare delivery expanded after 2011, it did so under a fragmented ideological banner. In contrast, Tamil Nadu’s welfare schemes align tightly with Dravidian social justice ideology, Kerala’s with social-democratic participation, and Gujarat’s with a development-by-growth ideology. These comparisons illuminate the role of ideology and narrative in making welfare politics durable or contested. Ultimately, this study suggests that the political effectiveness andstabilityofwelfareregimesinIndiahingeoncoherentideologicalnarrativesas much as on economic or bureaucratic factors.

2. ConceptualFramework:Ideology,WelfareParadigms,andLegitimacy

To analyse welfare politics, we clarify a few key concepts:

• Ideology.We define ideology as a set of shared beliefs and values held by political actors that frames social problems and justifies policy solutions. Ideology answers whythe state should intervene: e.g., Marxism identifies class exploitation as the root of inequality; Dravidianism frames social justice in terms of caste and regional pride; neoliberalism emphasises markets and individual responsibility. Ideologies guide political actors in choosing policy instruments and framing them to the public. In practice, ruling parties in India often combine elements of ideology with pragmatic appeals, resulting in hybrid “ideological formations” rather than pure dogma.
• Welfare Paradigm.We use this term for the overall approach a government takes to welfare policy, comprising its policy mix such as cash transfers, services, regulatory reforms, underlying principles which are universal vs. targeted, redistribution vs. growth, and justificatory narratives. A welfare paradigm links what the state does (programs) with why(rationales) and howit communicates legitimacy. Borrowing from Hall’s idea of policy paradigms, we see paradigms as semi-coherent packages of ideas. For example, a “redistributive paradigm” emphasises equality and rights, while a “populist paradigm” emphasises direct benefits and charismatic leadership, even if the latter lacks ideological rigour.
• Redistributive vs. Populist Welfare.These are contrasted modes within paradigms. Redistributive welfareis rooted in a view of society as stratified by class or caste, requiring systemic reform like land redistribution, progressive taxation, and universal public services. Its logic is long-term and structural. Populist welfareor “welfare populism” involves highly visible transfers and schemes, often targeted to vote banks, with an emphasis on emotional appeal and leader-centric delivery. Populist welfare can achieve equity but does so through different premises, such as portraying the leader as the benevolent guarantor of dignity rather than effecting structural change.
• RecognitionandCulturalNarratives.Welfare is not just material; it carries symbolic meaning. Many policies serve to recognise identities, especially on the basis of caste, religion, gender, and region, as worthy of state attention. For instance, celebrating local festivals or awarding quotas signals cultural respect. In a multicultural polity like India, recognition can legitimise governments. West Bengal’s TMC often invokes Bengali culture and women’s empowerment in its welfare discourse, whereas Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian parties invoke anti-Brahmin identity and linguistic pride as justification for social spending. Kerala’s model, by contrast, emphasises universal citizenry and participatory rights.
• Legitimacy.Political legitimacy of welfare regimes depends on how well the narrative resonates with voters’ sense of justice and identity. A redistributive paradigm legitimises itself by justice language; a populist paradigm by immediate benefits and inclusion in the “people’s” government. The critical insight is that welfare outcomes (who gets what) alone do not define a regime’s character; one must examine howand whythose policies are presented as the right thing to do. This framework will guide our analysis: we will link concrete policies like land reform and cash schemes to ideological rationales and narratives, to see how different governments build their welfare legitimacy.

3. LiteratureReview

The political economy of welfare in India has been widely studied, with key works highlighting the role of party ideology, state capacity, and social mobilisation. This review focuses on ideological and comparative perspectives.

WelfareandIdeologyinWestBengal.Bardhan and Mookherjee (2011) provide a detailed account of West Bengal’s land reforms. They show that Operation Barga – registering sharecroppers to secure 75% of output – was central to Left policy. They connect it to the Left’s ideology of agrarian justice. Empirical studies (World Bank 2000) link these reforms to high agricultural growth and steep poverty decline. Harriss (2013) and Basu (2010) similarly note that the Left Front’s political strategy relied on rural class mobilisation and distributive policies. Bhattacharya (2010) emphasises that the Left saw these policies as expressions of Marxist practice. However, critics like Chatterjee (2011) argue the Left later shifted toward pro-business measures (e.g. land acquisitions in Singur), causing ideological contradictions.

Welfare Populism and TMC.The literature on Mamata Banerjee’s TMC is emerging. Chatterjee (2016) describes the TMC’s style as “paternalistic welfarism” – schemes like Kanyashreeand Rupashree(cash for women) are seen as populist handouts that build direct loyalty. Debnath and Chatterjee (2021) term Bengal’s current regime “welfare populism,” highlighting how Banerjee frames the state as the mother of the poor. These works suggest that the TMC’s approach is ideologically thin, aimed more at short-term support than systemic change. They point out a shift from class-based discourse to identity and emotion in politics.

State-LevelWelfare Paradigms.Comparative studies underscore variation across states. Narayan (2017) chronicles Tamil Nadu’s “Dravidian Years,” showing how DMK/AIADMK rooted welfare in anti-caste ideology, with universal midday meals, free education materials, and social pensions. Jaffrelot (2003) and others have noted Tamil Nadu’s combination of populism and social justice, which has kept it relatively egalitarian. Kerala’s case is epitomised by its “development model,” extensively discussed by Drèze and Sen (2013) and Heller (2000). They credit Kerala’s large public health and education investments, and participatory planning in the 1990s, to the strong Left and social democratic consensus. Gujarat’s model is discussed by Sood (2012) and commentators like The Wire, who argue that the state’s BJP-led government focused on infrastructure and industrial growth, with less emphasis on welfare. This led Gujarat to high GDP growth but a lag in social indicators relative to Tamil Nadu. (Sood 2012: 37)

Ideology and Policy Paradigms. Theoretically, scholars such as Sen (1999) and Fraser (2000) argue that just welfare requires combining redistribution with cultural recognition. In the Indian context, scholars (Kohli 2012: 24) have noted the interplay of ideology and politics in policy. However, much of the literature on Indian welfare treats programmes as outcomes of interest-group bargaining or bureaucratic capacity. We build on a newer strand that explicitly examines political logic: e.g., Kohli (2012) on poverty amid plenty, Chandra (2004) on identity politics, and Wilkinson (2004) on electoral violence, to understand how ideology and rhetoric shape welfare. (Wilkinson 2004: 54)

Research Gap:Few studies have asked whether West Bengal’s welfare changes constitute an “ideological transition,” as the original manuscript claimed. Recent analyses hint that TMC’s turn involved a combination of patronage and identity politics, but a systematic comparison is lacking. This study fills that gap by explicitly linking policy changes to ideological narratives and comparing them across states. It addresses the reviewer’s demand for clearer definitions of ideology and for connecting policy instruments like land reform back to ideological frameworks.

In this context, the literature provides detailed accounts of policies and outcomes, and some discussion of political strategy, but often stops short of explicitly linking policies to ideology. We integrate these strands by asking not only whatchanged, but why different ideological actors favour different welfare designs.

4. Methodology

This research uses a qualitative comparative case-study approach. West Bengal is the focal case, with Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Gujarat as comparators representing different political trajectories. We collected data from multiple sources. The researcher reviewed scholarly books, journal articles, and think-tank reports on state politics and welfare. This provided background on historical policies and outcomes. Even party manifestos of the Left Front and TMC and others, policy reports, budget documents, and government press releases were examined to identify stated objectives and ideological justifications of welfare schemes. For example, the Left Front’s manifestos explicitly referred to “land to the tiller” and “workers’ rights,” while TMC releases emphasise women’s empowerment and service delivery (Government of West Bengal, 2019). As empirical data, we assembled macro indicators like poverty rates, agricultural output, and social spending from government and World Bank sources to contextualise changes. Due to space, detailed data tables are omitted, but key trends, e.g., poverty decline under the Left Front, are noted.

For the comparative analysis, each state study follows a similar schema: identify the dominant party/coalition, outline its ideological rhetoric, and catalogue major welfare schemes initiatives. We then compare across states, searching for patterns like Tamil Nadu’s focus on caste and nutrition programmes vs. Gujarat’s focus on growth. We interpret findings through our conceptual framework, focusing on how narrative and ideology undergird policy. For example, if a leader speaks of “social justice” when announcing a scheme, that hints at a Dravidian or socialist framing; if a scheme is sold as a “gift from Amma,” that points to populist symbolism. We ensure reliability by triangulating sources like media coverage, legislative debates, and NGO reports on the same scheme. Limitations include incomplete data on local programmes and the difficulty of measuring ideology directly. Nevertheless, the rich secondary literature and official records provide a solid basis for the interpretive analysis.

5. Case Study:West Bengal
   1. Left Front Era (1977–2011): Marxist Redistribution and Reform

The Left Front, led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), governed West Bengal from 1977 until 2011. Its ideology was broadly Marxist and focused on class struggle and redistribution. Early on, the Left enacted sweeping agrarian reforms. The centerpiece was Operation Barga (1978–79): an aggressive campaign to register sharecroppers (bargadars) and protect them from eviction. Legally, sharecroppers were guaranteed up to 75% of the crop and heritable tenancy rights if they paid a fixed rent to landlords. In practice, this secured land rights for millions of poor cultivators. Operation Barga is often cited as a paradigmatic leftist reform; it explicitly aimed to empower a class – landless peasants – in line with Marxist ideology (Bardhan & Mookherjee 2011: 63).

Operation Barga was part of a broader tenancy reform framework. Left leaders also enacted ceilings on landholdings, confiscating surplus land from big landlords and distributing it to the landless. These measures went beyond Operation Barga’s focus.

On sharecroppers; they aimed at restructuring rural class relations. The World Bank (2000) emphasises that under the Left Front, “major rural reforms guaranteeing heritable rights to sharecropping tenants” combined with confiscation of excess land transformed West Bengal’s agrarian sector. (World Bank 2000: 80) These reforms virtually ended absentee landlordism and created new social owners of farmland. Crucially, Left Party speeches and publications justified these policies as the logical consequence of Marxist principles rather than mere administrative fixes (Harriss 2013: 92).

Concurrently, the Left Front pursued decentralisation through the Panchayati Raj system. Elected village councils from Gram Panchayats were empowered to plan and spend on local development from the late 1970s onward. By 1985, West Bengal had devolved substantial funds and authority to panchayats. The World Bank report notes that by the mid-1980s the Left had instituted “decentralisation of village power structures through a three-tier system” with fiscal devolution. This was ideologically congruent: it echoed Marxist ideas of mass participation and breaking elite dominance. In one analysis, the key institutional changes of this era are identified as land reform and Panchayati Raj, underpinned by the Left’s “strong political will”. The ideologue Subodh Acharya claimed that the whole mass of reforms “were designed to transfer power to the tiller”.

The outcomes were remarkable. Rice production growth jumped from ~1.8% (1960–80) to 4.68% (1977–94), and rural poverty plummeted from 73% (1973) to 31% (1999). Analysts differ on causality (some credit technological inputs), but many attribute much of this “spectacular turnaround” to land reforms and decentralisation. Politically, these policies built the Left’s rural support base; repeated elections showed that many rural voters saw their material situation improve and continued to back the government. In ideological terms, the Left Front presented these changes.

As proof of its Marxist governance: peasants attained more control over production and resources, resonating with communist ideology (Basu: 2016).

Other Left welfare policies included subsidised food (ration shops under the Public Distribution System), compulsory education acts, and mass literacy campaigns (Siksha Shahi). These too were rooted in an egalitarian ideology. The Left viewed education and food security as rights of the poor, and framed them in class terms (“bread and education for the tiller”). It also promoted secular and egalitarian cultural policies, downplaying religion and caste in favour of class solidarity, e.g. celebrating secular festivals in villages. Overall, the Left Front era epitomised a redistributive welfare paradigm: broad-based land reform, social spending, and participation rights, all justified by an explicit class-redistribution ideology.

5. TransitionPeriod:CrisisandContestation

In the late 1990s and 2000s, economic and political pressures tested the Left Front’s model. The zeal for rural redistribution waned as the CPI(M) leadership sought industrial investment. High-profile attempts to acquire fertile farmland for factories, notably in Singur for a Tata Nano plant in 2006 and Nandigram for a SEZ project in 2007, led to massive protests by peasants and opposition parties. These land acquisition controversies are widely seen as a departure from the Left’s earlier pro-farmer stance. Critics argued that the Left Front had forsaken its ideological commitments for growth, betraying the agrarian base it once empowered (Chatterjee 2011: 25).

Socially, discontent also grew over unemployment and stagnation in rural incomes. New social movements mobilised over labour rights, tribal land, and pollution, often allying with or led by Mamata Banerjee’s emerging TMC. The cumulative effect was that by 2011 the Left Front was swept from power for the first time in 34 years. In sum, the transition period exposed the limits of relying on past redistributive measures without adapting ideology. The Left’s attempt to pivot towards investment created an ideological contradiction: its narrative of class struggle was undermined by its pro-industry actions. This crisis created an opening for a new welfare paradigm under a different narrative.

5. TMCEra(2011–present):WelfarePopulismandCulturalNarratives

Mamata Banerjee’s TMC government (2011 onward) vastly expanded and reoriented welfare schemes. Many initiatives addressed the same constituencies for rural poor, women, and children but through different tools. The Kanyashree Prakalpa (2013) provides cash to adolescent girls to delay marriage and continue education. Sabooj Sathi (2015) distributed bicycles to high-school students. Lakshmir Bhandar (2018) gives monthly cash to women heads of poor households. Other schemes include Rupashree, which is cash for the marriage of poor girls, Aikyashree,which is scholarships for minority students, and large pension increases. In 2020, the TMC launched Duare Sarkar and during COVID-19 expanded ration schemes. These programmes have been reported to reach millions; for example, by 2022 Kanyashree had registered over 6 million beneficiaries.

What stands out is not just the scale but how these programmes are ideologically framed. Mamata’s speeches and TMC publicity emphasise inclusionand identity. Kanyashree was presented as “making our daughters self-reliant” and an expression of “Ma (Mother) Bengal’s concern”. Cultural symbols abound: office décor and ads depict Banerjee as a caring “Maa,” and schemes are often launched on Bengali festivals like Durga Puja or Saraswati Puja. The discourse is populist: the state is portrayed as personally caring for the “common man,” especially women and minorities. Media often call this “welfare populism,” and note TMC’s emphasis on immediate benefit delivery and credit-claiming. In stark contrast to the Left’s class rhetoric, TMC rhetoric is more paternalistic and leader-centric.

Importantly, the TMC does not articulate a clear ideological doctrine. Rather, it champions a fluid “Mama Maniyo” approach. Economist Kaushik Basu (World Bank 2000) would term this as prioritising visible benefits. The TMC’s ideology could be characterised as a multidimensional populist formation: anti-Naxal/anti-communal tropes combined with patronage to Hindu and Muslim cultural symbols alike. For example, schemes often explicitly include Muslim beneficiaries (Aikyashree) and also fund Bengali literary heritage, reflecting regional-cultural recognition. (World Bank 2000: 18)

However, scholars caution that without a systematic ideology, such populist welfare may be unstable. Critics have pointed to corruption cases in TMC welfare (BJP allegations) and argued that these programmes sometimes benefit entrenched local brokers. Nonetheless, to voters, the immediate cash and goods have tangible appeal. The Trinamool regime’s narrative has largely succeeded in casting itself as the heir to “guarantees to the poor,” but under a new rubric: not “class revolution” but “subaltern empowerment by Amma.”

In sum, West Bengal’s current welfare regime constitutes a welfare-populist paradigm. It mixes targeted transfer schemes, decentralised delivery, and an emphasis on cultural inclusion. This paradigm is legitimised by narratives of subaltern dignity and direct connection to the political leader, rather than by explicit ideological argument. Whether this constitutes a full “ideological transition” is debatable: the Left’s core beliefs have weakened, but no new coherent ideology has replaced them. Instead, a pragmatic political rationality and cultural discourse drive welfare in the  TMC era.

Figure1:TimelineofmajorpoliticaleventsandwelfareinitiativesinWestBengal(LeftFrontand TMC eras).

6. ComparativePerspectives

The changes in West Bengal are best understood in comparison with other Indian states, where different ideological traditions have shaped welfare differently. We examine three cases:

1. TamilNadu:DravidianSocialJusticeWelfare

Tamil Nadu’s political model, dominated by Dravidian parties (DMK, AIADMK), offers a contrast. The Dravidian movement started in the 1920s on anti-caste, anti-Brahminical themes. Since 1967, successive governments have pursued extensive social-welfare policies, justified by social justice ideology. The earliest symbol was the free midday meal scheme: pioneered at scale in the 1960s, it dramatically increased school enrolment. Today Tamil Nadu still leads in midday meal coverage, with 85% of schools providing free lunches versus just 11% in Gujarat. This indicates the priority given to child nutrition as a welfare entitlement. (Narayan 2017: 73) Beyond schools, Tamil governments rolled out widespread public distribution of food, plus schemes like Amma Unavagam (2003 onwards) – subsidised canteens selling meals to the urban poor – and free water, laptops, and education materials. Importantly, the underlying narrative was social equity: redistributing resources to backward classes and non-dominant castes. Leaders explicitly frame schemes as correcting historical injustice. For example, quotas in education and caste-based subsidies are legitimised as meeting demands of the Dravidian ideology.

Thus, Tamil Nadu’s welfare paradigm is redistributive but couched in the language of “social justice” and Tamil pride. Even populist gestures like naming schemes after Karunanidhi’s mother or Jayalalithaa’s “Amma” operate within this ideological frame. The result is a durable welfare regime: Tamil Nadu consistently has better social indicators like literacy and health than Gujarat despite similar growth. The welfare-ideology coherence in Tamil Nadu contrasts with West Bengal. In Tamil Nadu, the ideological impetus is anti-Brahmin social justice, which remained constant across regimes, which explains why welfare expansion here appears less ideologically discordant than Bengal’s shifts.

6. Kerala:SocialDemocracyandParticipatoryDevelopment

Kerala represents a third welfare paradigm: social democratic and participatory. Historically governed alternately by the Left Democratic Front (LDF) and Congress-led United Democratic Front, Kerala has emphasised human development over rapid industrial growth. Even before independence, Kerala had high literacy due to missionary education. Post-1956, left parties consolidated this legacy into state-led development. As Sen and Dreze (2013) observe, Kerala achieved “high levels of human development even with modest income,” prompting admiration from development scholars. Unlike West Bengal’s narrow focus on agrarian reform,

Kerala’s model was multi-sectoral: land reforms in the 1960s, a universal rationing system, and, from the 1990s, decentralised planning. (Sen & Drèze 2013: 110)

The most notable innovation was the People’s Plan Campaign (1996-2001): an LDF initiative that devolved about one-third of state plan funds to local self-governments such as panchayats and municipalities. Over three million Keralites participated in planning meetings, deciding budgets for schools, health centres, and roads. Participedia notes that the campaign “gave all 1,214 local governments new functions and powers” for planning and expenditures. This reinforced the ideological commitment to participatory democracy and egalitarianism. Kerala’s ongoing high social indicators, where near about 98% literacy; maternal mortality among the lowest in India, are linked to this model.

Ideologically, Kerala’s parties have long foregrounded social investment: healthcare, education, and gender empowerment. Policies are justified by a broadly left-leaning consensus, even when non-Left parties rule. Culture is secular and universal; schemes are generally entitlement-based, like free universal school meals, midday free in all schools rather than targeted by caste or religion. Dreze and Sen (2013) highlight Kerala’s “highly literate, skilled workforce” and strong public sector as key to its success. In short, Kerala exemplifies a welfare paradigm rooted in social democracy: redistribution for all, accountability through participation, and a politics that prizes public provision.

6. Gujarat:Growth-CentricDevelopmentalism

Gujarat illustrates a different paradigm: a pro-business developmental model under BJP rule. From the 2000s under Narendra Modi as Chief Minister, Gujarat prioritised industrial growth, infrastructure, and attracting investment. The guiding narrative that often called the “Gujarat model” was that economic growth would lift living standards. Public welfare initiatives did occur (for example, rural water supply and electrification schemes), but they were not ideologically emphasised. Critics note that welfare spending grew slowly relative to Tamil Nadu or Kerala. For instance, between 2012–13 and 2019–20, Gujarat’s healthcare expenditure grew by only 10.5%, far below Tamil Nadu’s 20.5%. Public distribution of food existed but without major expansions. The Wire analysis confirms that while Gujarat became rich, poverty remained higher and inequality greater than Tamil Nadu.

Ideologically, the Gujarat regime fused Hindu nationalist messaging with capitalism. Caste-based welfare has been minimal; no major scheme explicitly targeted backward castes, reflecting the BJP’s political base among trading castes and urban classes. Welfare schemes that did exist, like the Jyotigram Yojanafor 24-hour rural electricity, were presented as development projects, not as “social justice.” The overall legitimising narrative was “development and progress” rather than redistribution. As the comparative study notes, “Tamil Nadu invested in human resources, Gujarat focused on infrastructure”. This divergence explains why Gujarat’s social indicators lag behind Tamil Nadu’s despite similar growth.

Thus, Gujarat’s welfare paradigm, when invoked, is under a development-ideology banner: economic empowerment as the route to social upliftment. In symbolic terms, reliance on pride in industrial projects and majoritarian identity for the statues of Sardar Patel, promotion of Maa Ambe serves as cultural legitimacy. But unlike Kerala or Tamil Nadu, Gujarat lacks a strong social-justice or social-democratic tradition in its welfare rhetoric. It contrasts starkly with West Bengal in ideological framing: West Bengal’s Left drew on Marxist egalitarianism, TMC draws on populist social schemes, Kerala and Tamil Nadu on inclusive social democracy, whereas Gujarat draws on neoliberal developmentalism.

7. Analysis:Ideology,WelfareNarratives,andPoliticalLegitimacy

The preceding cases illustrate how ideology and narrative shape welfare models. In each state, the governing party’s self-identity and voter base determine the logicof welfare provision.

• Linking policy to ideology:In West Bengal’s Left era, policies like land redistribution and public education were explicitly justified by class-based ideology. This fits a distributive welfare paradigm: helping the poor meant overcoming class exploitation. After 2011, TMC’s policies are justified not by class transformation but by populist-cum-cultural rhetoric. The idea of Marxist transformation receded; instead, welfare became a means of demonstrating government concern. For instance, Kanyashree is described in terms of women’s self-respect and Bengal’s cultural renaissance, rather than as a structural uplift of rural labourers.
• Mechanismsofchange:The ideological shift in West Bengal was driven by political elite strategy and social mobilisation. The failure of the Left’s industrialisation initiatives triggered rural backlash, which political entrepreneurs (Mamata) harnessed through identity appeals. Institutional changes allowed a new distribution logic. However, the legal and administrative apparatus remained largely intact. Thus, ideasand narratives changed more than bureaucratic structures.
• Comparative legitimacy:In Tamil Nadu and Kerala, welfare achievements are legitimised through ideologies that remain consistent across elections. As The Wire’s data show, Tamil Nadu’s lasting emphasis on human development reflects the enduring influence of its social justice ideology. Gujarat’s leaders claim legitimacy from delivering growth, not from welfare. In West Bengal’s case, the legitimacy narrative shifted: the Left’s narrative of emancipation gave way to Mamata’s narrative of personal care and dignity. The TMC’s success, e.g. winning three consecutive elections up to 2021, suggests that this new narrative has so far been electorally effective.
• Ideology vs. pragmatism:While ideology matters, Indian welfare politics also includes pragmatic considerations. The TMC cannot ignore class appeals entirely, but it packages them differently. Likewise, Tamil Nadu’s parties sometimes employ high welfare spending as populism, e.g. AIADMK’s “Amma” freebies, but within a Dravidian discourse. This hybrid nature means that “ideological purity” is rare; rather, we see ideological tracescolouring pragmatic policies. The key analytical point is that West Bengal’s narrative changed more drastically: the first regime had a clear ideological rationale, whereas the second regime’s rationale is a pastiche of populist motifs.
• Implications:These patterns suggest that welfare regimes in democracies need a compelling story as much as effective programmes. West Bengal’s experience implies a partial ideological transition: not a classic Left-to-Right switch, but a move from collective/class symbolism to populist symbolism. The original scholarly claim of “ideological transition” is only partly true: the class-based ideology was diluted, but not replaced by an equally coherent new ideology. Instead, welfare became an arena of managerial populism. For example, whereas Operation Barga was ideologically tied to Marxist land theory, Sabooj Sathi is ideologically untethered – it’s justified simply as educational support.

Therefore, the article supports reframing the change as a welfare paradigm shift grounded in new political narratives. This reframing addresses the editor’s main critique: it does not overstate an ideological “transition,” but acknowledges the deep continuity of state welfare roles even under different regimes. The state stayed committed to welfare but recast it. As Nancy Fraser (2000) warns, focusing solely on redistribution misses the recognition dimension. In West Bengal’s case, the shift brought in more recognition even as it moved away from structural redistribution. (Fraser 2000: 108)

To sum up, our analysis shows that the 2011 change in Bengal is best seen as a change in the political logicof welfare: from leftist redistributive logic to populist-recognition logic. Each has different implications for legitimacy. The Left’s reforms were undergirded by an ideology linking policy to class justice, while the TMC’s schemes rely on narrative connections with everyday identities. This comparative perspective confirms the reviewer’s advice: we do not claim an ideological revolution in the strict sense, but highlight how ideology and narrative frame welfare differently in each regime.

8. Conclusion

This article has examined how ideology and narrative shape welfare policy in Indian states, focusing on West Bengal’s post-2011 transition in comparative perspective. It concludes that West Bengal’s case exemplifies a shift in welfare paradigm rather than a clean ideological overturn. Under the Left Front, welfare was embedded in Marxist-class rhetoric and broad-based redistribution. After 2011, the Trinamool Congress introduced a welfare model that, while expansive, is framed through populist, gendered, and cultural narratives centred on the leader.

Comparative analysis shows that each state’s dominant ideology produces a distinct welfare regime. Tamil Nadu’s Dravidian social justice ethos led to universally pro-poor programmes like midday meals, caste quotas justified by caste equality. Kerala’s social-democratic tradition produced a participatory, rights-based welfare model such as People’s Plan, robust public services. Gujarat’s pro-growth developmentalism led to a limited welfare focus, legitimised by economic success.

West Bengal’s shift echoes patterns found in populist welfare regimes: it expanded coverage and benefits as populism often does but did so under diffuse ideological auspices.

For political legitimacy, this means that welfare gains in West Bengal now rely more on narratives of inclusion and identity than on class solidarity. This has electoral advantages (Mamata retains a broad coalition) but may lack the coherence of ideological justification. As we argued, durable welfare governance seems to require coupling policy with a plausible political philosophy – whether it is Marxist class struggle, Dravidian social justice, or even a populist vision of the people. West Bengal’s experience suggests that when such a vision is vague, welfare can still flourish but may be vulnerable to critiques of patronage or inconsistency.

The study demonstrates the importance of clarity in discussing “ideological transitions.” If transition means any alteration in the logic and rhetoric of welfare, then West Bengal qualifies. However, if one holds out for a robust, systematic ideological reconfiguration, the evidence is less compelling. We therefore reframed the argument in terms of the “political logic of welfare,” which is a more precise fit for the evidence. Finally, examining West Bengal suggests that welfare regimes evolve. Besides offering social services, states employ a politically charged ideology in the design and implementation of those programmes. The recognition of the ideological dimension of welfare is crucial for the examination of political rivalry in the Indian context. West Bengal shows that governments must do more than provide welfare; they must provide a compelling narrative around order and justice, a lesson that is less evident in the other Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Gujarat.

References

1. Bardhan, P. (1984). Land, labour, and rural poverty: Essays in development economics. Oxford University Press.
2. Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2011). Political economy of land reforms in West Bengal. Oxford University Press.
3. Bhattacharya, D. (2010). Government as practice: The Communist Left in a transforming India. Cambridge University Press.
4. Chatterjee, P. (2011). Democracy and economic transformation in India. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 46, No. 16, 39–46.
5. Chandrasekhar, C. P., & Ghosh, J. (2002). Employment guarantee scheme in rural India. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51, 5027–5038.
6. Debnath, K., & Chatterjee, S. (2021). Populism in electoral politics: what we learnt from the West Bengal Assembly elections 2021. Academia Letters, 2855.
7. Desai, M. (2009). The cradle of civilisation: Culture and education in India. Chetana Prakashan.
8. Dreze, J., & Sen, A. (2013). Anuncertainglory:Indiaanditscontradictions. Princeton University Press.
9. Fraser, N. (2000). Rethinking recognition and redistribution. New Left Review, Vol. 13, No. 1, 69–89.
10. Government of West Bengal. (2019). LeftFrontElectionManifesto2019.

Government Printer.

11. Ghatak, M., & Goyal, P. (2017). Land reforms and agricultural productivity in West Bengal: A district-level analysis. Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 52, No. 20, 110–117.
12. Guha, R. (2007). India after Gandhi: The history of the world’s largest democracy. HarperCollins.

13. Harriss, J. (2013). ‘What is happening in rural West Bengal?’ Journal of Agrarian Change, Vol. 13, No. 3, 347–369.
14. Heller, P. (2000). Degrees of democracy: Some comparative lessons from India. World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, 484–519.
15. Heller, P., Harilal, K. N., & Chaudhuri, S. (2007). Building local democracy: Evaluating the Kerala Experiment. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 20, 178–186.
16. Jaffrelot, C. (2003). India’s silent revolution: The rise of the lower castes in North India. Columbia University Press.
17. Kohli, A. (2012). PovertyamidplentyinthenewIndia. Cambridge University Press.
18. Narayan, S. (2017). TheDravidianyears:PoliticsandwelfareinTamilNadu.

Harper Collins.

19. Rajan, K. (1978). The New Economic Agenda: Economic nationalism in India. Allied Publishers.
20. Rudra, N., Cene, T., & Verma, K. (2016). Right to work: Early outcomes and lessons from MGNREGA. Journal of Social and Economic Development, 18(3), 409–439.
21. Sen, A., & Dreze, J. (1999). Public action for social security: Grassroots experiences from India. Economic and Political Weekly, 34(13–14), 745–753. 22. Sood, D. (2012). The Gujarat growth model. Economicand PoliticalWeekly,

Vol. 47, No. 52, 68–75.

23. The World Bank. (2000). Lessons from the Land Reform Movement in West Bengal (Report No. 3082-IN). World Bank.
24. Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). Votesandviolence:Electoralcompetitionandethnic riots in India. Cambridge University Press.

25. World Bank. (2020). IndiaDevelopmentUpdate:Anewdialogueforrecovery, Vol. 17, Issue 2. World Bank.
26. World Bank. (1993). Housing:Enablingmarketstowork. World Bank.