ABSTRACT: The August 2024 changes in Bangladesh through forced deposal of Sheikh Hasina regime and coming together of disparate forces to form a caretaker government has unleashed destabilizing forces. A strong and exclusive religious majoritarian identity has been trying to shape the polity and society of the country since then. Forces which remained dormant or relatively marginalized for long have asserted to stake claims in the new scenario. Challenges to rule of law, human rights, economy and stability in general, seems to be unabated. This scenario has significant implications not only the country but also for the entire region. The short article which is based on a paper presentation, is a modest attempt to focus on the above mentioned facets.
Key words: Stability, identity, extremism, geo-strategic, marginalization.
The cataclysmic changes in Bangladesh in August 2024 has raised certain critical questions and premonitions for the country itself and also South Asia at large. While the dissension had been brewing over a long period of time, the ferocity of the rupture of the socio-political and economic system within a few weeks have taken the observers and scholars by surprise. Scenarios which world has seen being played out in West Asia over decades resulting in abrupt regime changes have been witnessed at our doorstep. The horrific trends like meting out of instant justice through extra-constitutional killings, dangling of mutilated bodies, extreme mob violence, arson and looting, minority persecution, destruction of installations/dwellings symbolizing anything to do with the previous regime are all tell-tale signs of outburst of long nurtured anger and frustration. Parallels of such scenarios have been witnessed in violent regime changes in Iran, Iraq and recently in Syria.
The change has been caused by a host of factors of which two interlinked appear to be very significant as is discussed below.
Identity factor:-
A glance at history shows that the landmass which is Bangladesh today has repeatedly been in a state of ferment. It has historically been caught between assertions of an ethno-religion based identity and an ethno-cultural based identity. Seldom a country has shown such rapid shifts in its national ideological foundations. (Kabir, 1994:15) People of the geographical arena considered themselves to be Muslim-Bengali during vivisection of the Indian subcontinent. The ethno-religious identity asserted itself in the run up to the creation of Pakistan in 1947 of which East Pakistan was a part. A few year after 1947, a host of socio-political and economic reasons led to the ascendance of the hitherto subsumed ethno-cultural identity expressing itself through a love for the Bengali language against the imposition of the Urdu language in East Pakistan by the West Pakistan ruling elite. (Umar, 1979:32) In other words, the people now considered themselves to be Bengali-Muslims primarily, in supersession to being Muslim-Bengalis. This assertion of what was essentially Bengali culture, of which language was an integral part, was the driving force in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. (Anisuzzaman, 1976) The creation of Bangladesh however did not signify the total dilution of ethno-religious identity. While it receded to the margins temporarily, the votaries of this identity continued to influence society and politics and gradually was rehabilitated from the early 1970s itself. The constant interaction between these two identities and a third one, that emerged later in form of Bangladeshi identity in mid 1970s, continue to shape the history and politics of Bangladesh. Thus, it may be stated that Bangladesh is a country riven by ideological contradictions. While ideological contradictions are markers of a vibrant political system, successive ruling dispensations have failed to manage the contradictions which eventually spawned instability.
The current crisis in Bangladesh has hallmarks of the above stated dynamics. While the Awami League (AL) has always been identified as a votary of secular nationalism linked to the ethno-linguistic identity, the non-Awami League parties especially the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) has been identified with ethno-religious identity. To be more precise, Islam impregnated the territorial Bangladeshi identity with religious exclusivity while Islam has always been central to religion based party like the JI. Based on the construction of this sharp binary, Awami League has been branded to be ‘pro-Indian’ to the extent of diluting core national interests. Non-Awami League parties have been perceived to be ‘anti-Indian’ (of various degrees) because of their supposed espousal of issues of national interests. However, irrespective of political ideologies and regimes, Islam has played a critical role shaping Bangladesh politics since 1971. It has set the broad ideological parameters within which all parties have had to operate. At different points history, the AL, BNP and Jatiya Party (JP) has taken political help from the Islamic right for electoral gains. (Rashiduzzaman, 1994:975) The gradual decay of the leftist forces due to ideological and political dissonance and global factors has moved the whole spectrum more rightwards.
A symptomatic reference can be made to substantiate the above stated dynamic. If one can recall the campaign slogans of Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat e Islami during elections in the 1990s, one can see the importance of Islam. The slogan of Awami League was “La Ilaha Illallah Noukor Malik tui Allah” (There is no God but Allah, Allah is the Owner of the Boat; Boat is the symbol of AL) that of the BNP was “La Ilaha Illallah Dhaner Sishe Bismillah” (There is no God but Allah, Allah resides on the sheaf of Paddy; Paddy sheaf is the symbol of BNP and that of the Jamaat e Islami was “Vote dilay Pallay Khushi hobe Allaye” (If you vote for the weighing scale, Allah will be happy; Weighing scale is the symbol of JI). The common factor in all the slogans were reverence to Allah and more importantly, crafty use of the peoples’ attachment to religion for political purpose. What happened recently also is merely aggressive use of religion to mobilise the disparate opposition forces against the regime in power. The power of religion as a mobilizing factor in South Asian politics was once more vividly demonstrated.
Further, it is important to question a standard proposition about Bangladesh politics. It would be myopic to surmise that the country was ‘secular’ during Awami League regimes and ‘non-secular’ during regimes of other parties irrespective of changes in the Constitutions. Despite inclusion of the term like ‘Secularism’ in the 1972 Constitution, Islam started to have a deep imprint on the polity and society of Bangladesh even during the tenure of Seikh Mujib. His initial euphoria with secularism was met with resistance from within his party and some sections of the society who did not want religion to be relegated from its centrality in an overwhelmingly Muslim majority country. Mujib’s withdrawal from robust secularism marked the beginning of ascendency of Islam in Bangladesh. This withdrawal was starkly visible in diverse fronts. Education, public life, foreign policy- all bore the deepening imprint of gradual de-secularisation. While the Awami League regimes may have been able to limit the overt display of Islamic symbolism in public life, the spread of radicalization process proceeded without much inhibition at the grassroot level. The process obviously gained momentum during the rules of Ziaur Rahman and Ershad. Even after the restoration of democracy in 1991, Islam held on to its salience and even prospered.
Under such circumstances, majoritarianism in Bangladesh has for obvious reasons revolved more around religion and not around language and axiomatically, religious extremism was destined to have an increasing say in the country. The salience of religious extremism and its linkage with political mobilization has long been a feature of Bangladesh politics. The recent outburst merely helped in crossing a threshold by which these forces have successfully infiltrated policy making positions. One may recall the article by Bertil Lintner titled Bangladesh: A Cocoon of Terror published in Far Eastern Economic Review in 2002. (Lintner, 2002) It invited tremendous criticism in Bangladesh for supposedly portraying Bangladesh in a poor light. One can also refer to Hiranmay Karlekar’s prophetic book of the 1990s titled Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? (Karlekar, 2005)
However, while analyzing the current situation as an outcome of the interplay of various identities, one cannot discount the evolving socio-political and economic context over the last decade of AL rule which provided a perfect background for the mass upheaval. Huge unemployment, highly unfavourable land to man ratio, massive electoral malpractices for over a decade, deep democratic distrust between parties, increasing authoritarian tendencies manifested through centralization of power, crony capitalism and its accompanying malpractices, shrinking of democratic space for the opposition, misuse of administrative machineries to curtail human rights, perception of sale out of national interests to India and a host of other factors created a correct ambience which was assiduously used by the anti-AL forces to engineer the change. These developments may well be the latest of innumerable reminders that malgovernance begets violence and instability in the long run.
Minorities
The minorities have had to suffer the brunt of this deep identity based politics. (Malik, 1998: 173)Their condition appears to be more precarious after the change. Historically they have failed to assert themselves strongly as an integral part of the national identity of the country. The presence of India on all sides has always acted as a strong incentive for the Hindus to look for support and succor from the big neighbor. A huge number of middle class and wealthy Hindus have over time have acquired landed property and real estate in West Bengal legally or otherwise driven by the premonition of crossing over in case of any major instability. The recent attempts of crossing over by many Bangladeshi Hindus are testimony to the above stated tendency. A substantial number of Hindus in Bangladesh have kin support system across the border which is perceived as a safety net in face of uncertainty. Ironically, the majority community in Bangladesh perceives India to be the natural home and habitat of the Hindus. There is a subtle perennial pressure on the Hindus to prove their allegiance to Bangladesh vis-à-vis their natural pull towards India. (Barkat 2013)
Political leaders from the Hindu and other minority communities across political spectrum have also failed to air the grievances of their communities in fear of losing their political perks. While Hindu and Chakma leaders in Awami League have held important positions in the party hierarchy, it has not translated into greater say for their communities in decision making. In other words, these leaders have been used as figurative representatives in the political setups. Minority leaders in BNP and JP are in a more straitjacketed condition due to the expressed ideological orientation of the parties.
The various socio-religious bodies of the minority communities have also had limited reach in a strongly majoritarian state. Organisations like Ramakrishna Mission, Bharat Sevasharam Sangha and ISKCON have generally stayed clear from expressing any political opinions and thus have been largely allowed to operate unhindered for long. However, the aggressive religious majoritarianism post August 2024 have shrinked the space they hitherto enjoyed. The recent episode concerning the erstwhile ISKCON monk has been in public glare. But there has been quite a few incidents across Bangladesh. There is a growing tendency to view Hindu religious organisations as agencies of an inimical Indian state. Social organisations like the Hindu-Bouddha-Christian Oikya Parishad have also failed to strengthen the minority groups in the national social matrix. The narrative espousing liberal secular- Bengali identity involving Tagore, Nazrul, Lalan Fakir, Hasan Raja and many more intellectuals and observing festivals like Nabobarsha have had a diminishing return in Bangladesh over the years. While, they may have been more visible in urban Bangladesh as part of socio-political project of the intellectuals, it always faced question at the grassroots level of mainly rural Bangladesh.
Geo-strategic factor:-
Another important variable for Bangladesh’s internal politics perenially is its geo-strategic position in the subcontinent. While, bilateral issues with India is a much used and profitable political plank in almost all South Asian countries, it is much more pronounced in Bangladesh. Being hemmed in by India geographically has created a sense of ‘geographical fatalism’ among a sizeable section of Bangladeshi policy makers and society. The perception of being surrounded by a big and powerful neighbor has been shaping Bangladesh’s domestic politics for long. Perceived closeness towards India or the lack of it has been used as a yardstick to measure the strategic autonomy of Bangladesh. Since the days of East-Pakistan and even after Bangladesh was created, the territory has been used by forces inimical to Indian interests as base to foment trouble in North-East India. Similarly, India has been involved in the Shanti Bahini insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in order to gain strategic leverage in Bangladesh. Anti-Indianism has always been used as a potent instrument in the domestic politics of Bangladesh. In this context, one may refer to the Pyrdiwah incident on the India-Bangladesh border in 2001. Over a small territorial dispute, 16 BSF personnel were abducted, tortured to death and their bodies mutilated. The incident occurred when Sheikh Hasina was during the fag end of her first tenure as PM. While the incident was passed off as an adventurism of the local level commander of the Bangladesh border force, the sheer brutality and ferocity of the incident suggests a deep pathological hatred of India at the level of rank and file of the Bangladesh forces. The Government of India under the premiership of Atal Behari Vajpayee chose not to highlight the issue in order to not show Sheikh Hasina in a poor light.
Fundamentalism and anti-Indianism has an organic relationship in Bangladesh. At the grassroots level, this phenomenon has sometimes expressed itself through informal gatherings and religious congregations and waz mehfils. It is at times very difficult, especially in Bangladesh, to delineate between a purely religious discourse and discussion on Islamic way of life and scriptures on one hand and construction of a strong religious identity vis-à-vis other lesser identities. Expressions like ‘monafeq’, ‘kafir’ ‘nasara’ are used in many congregations to harden the insider-outsider dichotomy. The Shias, Ahmediayas and the Sufi followers have also faced persecution from the Islamic fundamentalists for not being Islamic enough or being outrightly non-Muslims. The ascendency of Hindu right in India has only helped in further increasing the stridency of religion based identity politics in Bangladesh.
There seems to be a psychological dimension to the bitter and at times pathological hatred towards India among certain sections of the Bangladeshi society. For them, the separation from Pakistan in 1971 triggered a sense of loss of geo-strategic and political leverage in relation to India. Not being part anymore of the main adversary of India developed a sense of victimhood. This dynamic was accentuated by the perception of a hegemonic India as a predominantly Hindu power. Developments like the annexation of Sikkim in 1975, intervention in Sri Lanka and Maldives merely led credence to this perception.
Thus, the internal identity question and geo-strategic relation with India have been two major dynamics in shaping politics in Bangladesh and are closely linked to one another. The lack of democratic institutionalization since independence and even after the restoration of democracy in 1991 has made politics more unstable. Thus, the revolt in August 2024 may have been sudden but the factors have been in play for long.
An analyses of the incidents over the last six months reveal an interesting trend. There appears to be a psychological urge being fulfilled through the recent developments, among sections of the Bangladeshi population who were against the creation of Bangladesh. As part of Pakistan prior to 1971, this section of society thought themselves to be empowered to challenge India being part of Pakistan. The scenario changed after Bangladesh emerged. They were now part of a small country, albeit independent, but very much dependent and encircled by a country which they had fought in 1971 as part of Pakistan. In other words, this group became disempowered in two ways. First, the side they were supporting had lost in 1971 and secondly they were now forced to become part of a new country which had developed good relations with their enemy. However, clemency, sharing of power, opportunistic political moves and strong grassroot level presence kept them relevant despite not being at the centre of power. Under such circumstances, it is only natural that the vanquished party of the 1971 struggle would try to reemerge at the centre of policymaking taking opportunity of the new scenario.
Externally speaking, post August 2024 Bangladesh offers a geo-strategic space for Pakistan. It can renew and reinvigorate logistical support to insurgency in North East India. Pakistan has followed this policy for long as part of its non-conventional operations against India after successive defeats in conventional wars. A plethora of insurgent outfits in the North East have benefitted in the past from Pakistani modules based in Bangladesh. During the long regime of Sheikh Hasina, the stable and friendly relations with India ensured that Bangladesh soil was becoming inhospitable for Pakistani operatives. The changed scenario in Bangladesh has provided Pakistan with huge diplomatic, economic, strategic and military leverage. The spurt of business, defence, administrative and diplomatic visits and pacts between Pakistan and Bangladesh along with restoration of shipping links are testament to the new reality in South Asia. It represents a huge challenge to India. Instability of a densely populous contiguous nation located in a strategically crucial area does not augur well for India in general and especially for the economically weaker eastern India and the fragile north-east.
Conclusion:-
Lastly, the most important question is -what is in store for Bangladesh? The situation is in a state of flux. The body of Upadeshta (Advisor) led by Professor Mohammad Yunus is seriously hamstrung by the almost impossible task of reconciling disparate elements who had temporarily pooled in their resources with the single agenda to dismantle the Awami League regime. The administration presently seems to be suffering from policy paralysis over various issues. The honeymoon period seems to be over and the new stakeholders are eager to have their share of power. Students unrest, economic downturn, lawlessness are only few of the problems staring at the new dispensation. So far no headway is made on plotting a roadmap (acceptable to all) for holding credible elections for forming a stable and legitimate government, the present instability is destined to continue. While the BNP is eager to come to power after a long hiatus, the rightist parties have sensed an opportunity to shape the politics as per their ideas. Interestingly, the Islamic right is not a homogeneous entity either. It is divided into various clans owing allegiance to different religious leaders at the grassroot level. The power vacuum created in August 2024 has unleashed forces of uncertainty not only within but also in the entire region.
References:-
1. Anisuzzaman Muhammad, (1976) Swaruper Sandhane, Jatiya Sahitya Prakashani, Dhaka.
2. Barkat Abul, (2013), Political Economy of Fundamentalism in Bangladesh, Mainstream Weekly, Vol-L1, No-14, New Delhi.
3. Kabir M.G, (1994) Changing face of Nationalism: The Case of Bangladesh, UPL, Dhaka.
4. Karlekar Hiranmay, (2005), Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan? Sage, New Delhi.
5. Lintner Bertil, (2002) Bangladesh: A Cocoon of Terror, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Hong Kong.
6. Malik Ross, (1998) ‘Minorities in Bangladesh’ in Development, Ethnicity and Human Rights in South Asia, Sage, New Delhi.
7. Rashiduzzaman M, (1994) The Liberals and the Religious Right in Bangladesh, Asian Survey, Vol-34 No.11, University of California.
8. Umar Badruddin, (1979) Purba Banglar Bhasa Andolon O Tatkalin Rajniti, Vol-1, Subarna Publishers, Dhaka.