West Bengal Political Science Review | Vol. XXVIII, 2026 | ISSN: 2230-8296
Political Science – New Dimensions: West Bengal Political Science Conference 2023
(This inaugural presentation, originally in Bengali, has been translated by Dr. Aditi Dey, formerly Principal, Shri Shikshyatan College, Kolkata)
The theme of this year’s (June 2023) Political Science Conference is “New Dimensions in Political Science.” This is a bold and challenging theme which needs careful investigation. For, I believe, the idea behind its selection must be to draw the attention of the faculty and students of political science to some of the most critical issues that the discipline is faced with. I believe there are themes that we have neglected in the past but demand our attention today just as there are issues from the classical past which throughout have impacted our political life deeply and critically and are likely to do so in the future. Therefore, ‘new dimensions’ can very much emerge from the old.
I am not going to present a thesis on the New Dimensions in Political Science here. In the next half hour or so, I intend to draw your attention to some such issues or themes not in a very systematic or interconnected manner but rather somewhat discretely.
If we think about the history of Political Science, two aspects come to our mind. One is the usual and commonplace one, that is, to look into how political thinking began and advanced in time. This leads us to the study of what is known as the history of political thought.
All of you present here are indeed well aware of the subject; you have gone through it as students, and as teachers, you are taking your students through it. Therefore, I need not labour much on this aspect of the past to enlighten the future at the present moment.
What, instead, I want to draw your attention to is the way Political Science has grown as a formal academic discipline, to take a brief look at the way it has been institutionally grounded in general as well as in our own country. I believe this history is not necessarily or not at all overlapping with the history of political thought.
Every institution is embedded in an academic ambience that is crucial to understanding the nature of ideas generated and the contribution of main thinkers in generating those ideas.
The first formal course in Political Science was offered in 1871 at Princeton University. In 1872, an institute named École Libre des Sciences Politiques was established in France. Though it has since undergone a name change, the institute essayed a crucial role in training eminent political scientists from various countries, one of them being the American political scientist, John William Burgess. It was Burgess who founded the first Political Science Department at Columbia University in 1880.
In 1895, the celebrated Fabian Socialist couple, Sydney and Beatrice Webb, established the London School of Economics whose avowed goal was to set up an institution that would create a system of teaching, learning, and research that would be “useful for the betterment of society.” The first Chair in Political Science was instituted in 1912 at Oxford University. All of this, besides being interesting information about the trajectory of the discipline, leaves room for rumination on the institutional history of Political Science in India.
In India, the first Political Science Department was established in 1922 in Lucknow University, the journey of which began first through holding the hands of the historians. The then Head of the Department was Dr. Beni Prasad, an eminent historian, whose doctoral thesis, “State in Ancient India,” was very well known and widely read. Dr. Prasad was succeeded by fellow historian and researcher, Dr. Ishwari Prasad, who shared laurels with the former for their pioneering research on Ancient India. After them, Dr. Tara Chand, the official historian of the Indian freedom movement, was at the helm of the Department. Initially, this responsibility was entrusted to another well-known historian, Professor Ramesh Chandra Majumdar. But probably due to differences of opinion with the then government, the baton was passed on to Dr. Tara Chand. Professor Ramesh Chandra Majumdar is credited with independently bringing out a three-volume History of the Freedom Movement in India other than Dr. Tara Chand’s four-volume official history of the freedom movement. The seminal contributions of these celebrated historians are acknowledged in providing leadership to the Department of Political Science, Lucknow University in its fledgling stages. The second Political Science Department came up in 1927 in Allahabad University with stalwarts like M.V. Pylee. The University of Madras had this honour in 1937 through the endeavour of Dr. Eddy Asirvatham. The works of these political scientists in the areas of political theory and constitutional issues were popular among students and teachers of the discipline.
I have presented here the major initial steps, but there is more to delve into and know about the evolution of Political Science in India. Since the teaching-learning of Political Science is integral to a nation’s political history, it is imperative to dwell on some relevant queries. For instance, we may ask, why in 1922? Why in Lucknow? How was the department founded? What was the academic environment? What was the net outcome?
A significant aspect of this time travel is the revelation that though Bengal was the nucleus of the politics of the freedom movement throughout the 19th century, Calcutta University, regarded as one of the three oldest universities in India, had its Department of Political Science established only in 1948, that is, after independence. It will hence be worthwhile to address the causes for such delay. Was it on account of the political opposition by Bengalis to the British Raj that they were denied the opportunity of teaching and learning of Political Science? Finding answers to such questions would constitute an indispensable part of building the history of the discipline in India.
It must be reiterated in this connection the enduring contribution and the notable role of Rajni Kothari in establishing the relevance and prominence of Political Science in India as a special area for the cultivation of social science knowledge. Rajni Kothari received his Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in 1958 and on his return to India began his teaching career in M. S. University, Baroda. In 1963, he founded the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) in Delhi. During 1960-61, his writings began to be published in the Economic and Political Weekly— then known as the Economic Weekly. The Editor of Economic Weekly, Sachin Chaudhury—a Calcutta Presidency College alumnus who also served as the finance minister of India for a time— had tremendous confidence in Kothari’s academic insights. He believed that Rajni Kothari would become an eminent political scientist in the future. Soon, a six-part series of Kothari titled, “Form and Substance of Indian Politics,” was published in the Economic Weekly. Professor Richard L. Park, a distinguished political scientist and a pioneering Indologist from the United States, then Director of the Asia Foundation, happened to read this and had significantly commented, “These papers breathe a fresh air in our understanding of Indian politics.”
It is to be noted that Rajni Kothari’s imprint on research in Indian politics has truly been impressive and far-reaching. His writings had been regular and prolific from 1960-61 to 2014, decades that had been witness to phases of great political churning, dotted with upheavals, agitations, and movements. In pan-Indian political history, this will be earmarked as a special interlude. Through all these years, Kothari had extensively and productively participated in discussions and deliberations on issues like multinational corporations, globalisation, non-government organisations, the state of the Congress system, and issues relating to civil society in general. He wrote incisively on these and on many other issues and analysed them with his sharp understanding of prevailing political realities. As one of independent India’s most distinguished political scientists, the abiding impact of Kothari’s ideas, thought processes, and analyses must be undertaken for critical scrutiny in real earnest by contemporary political scientists. That is yet to be done in full measure. The history of Political Science in India in the early years will become clearer through a detailed study of Kothari’s analyses and research. Moreover, a thorough review of his works will mirror the nature and evolution of politics in India during the first six-seven decades after independence.
Another issue which I wish to raise, an issue abound with debate, discussions, and hesitations, is regarding the two approaches in Political Science – first, the Philosophical Approach, and second, the Empirical/Quantitative Approach. It is my personal opinion that there exists no real difference between the two approaches. Put simply, the Philosophical approach helps develop a global perspective that enables the raising of “big” issues or the construction of “big” views. In doing this, one does not necessarily have any responsibility for specifying or measuring the components of the proposed perspective; the strength of logical reasoning is regarded as an adequate foundation for such ideas. On the other hand, those who work with the Empirical/Quantitative approach are bound by the need for accountability for the specifics, and possibly for measurement. Essentially, Political Science is a mix of both these approaches. One is a continuation of the other. Neither can be discarded or dispensed with. Those who employ either of the two approaches are invested with a common goal: how to build a normal, healthy community life where equality, freedom, rights, and dignity will ensure the quality of life in a civilised, humane world. Allusions to such a community can be found in the writings of Aristotle and also in Kautilya. In whatever form the Philosophical or Empirical/Quantitative approach has characterised contemporary Political Science, a clear sequence of common thinking has been evident. Let me elaborate the point through an example.
After World War II, ‘political community’ was especially sought to be popularised/familiarised as a ‘democratic community’. Post-World War II decades also witnessed the emergence of a global consensus in identifying democracy as ‘ideal’ for a political community. This global consensus was the reason why most countries desired to be described as “democratic”. For instance, a country like North Korea, whose existing political system is far removed from democracy, calls itself “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
Hence, the word ‘democratic’ has come to be imbued with a value and worth that have been globally accepted. Philosophical/normative theories of democracy abound. As a result, since the 1970s, in-depth studies and observations/measurements of ‘democratic’ processes in particular communities became a very promising academic pursuit for empirical political scientists.
It is important to mention here that Samuel Huntington introduced the notion of ‘democratic waves’ in his writings. According to him, the first wave occurred in the nineteenth century, the second wave after World War II, followed by the third wave in the 1970s, and it was expected, as every wave meant territorial expansion of democratic regimes, that subsequently during the fourth wave the whole world would become democratic. Huntington’s writings exemplified considerable hope and confidence in these “waves,” though at one time, he did talk about a “reverse wave” which in itself was extremely significant and germane to its discussion. Incidentally, it may not be totally out of place to point out here that in the 1990s there was much debate and discussion on the idea of “Time”, its nature and type. Two kinds of “direction” of time’s movement were identified – ‘Times Arrow’ and ‘Times Cycle’. Times Arrow meant time travelled like an arrow and was always forward moving. Times Cycle, on the other hand, did not move straight, revolved in circles thus following a wheel-shaped circular course. Now if one were to consider Times Arrow, then it could be assumed that democratic waves would continue to occur with its characteristic speed and ultimately and predictably the whole world will become ‘democratic’. If one were to consider Times Cycle, then it had to be assumed that everything could recur over and over again.
Just to contrast with these notions of time’s movement I may mention Indian conception of ‘time’, especially the one articulated by Swami Vivekananda. We have viewed time like a wave, having forward movement but through a series of crest and fall, believing that we can advance through such movement though hesitantly. Different conceptions of ‘time’ are crucial in navigating both ‘democratic waves’ and ‘reverse waves’.
Coming back to ‘democracy’, it is possible to argue that its biggest pillar is the ‘middle class’. Aristotle believed that democracy thrived whenever the ‘middle class’ was strong, healthy, and expansive. In its absence, the very idea of democracy would be shaky.
Interestingly, certain writings were published in the 1980s in Germany on “Nazi social base”, identifying and analysing the nature and composition of its social support base. These writings were based on information gleaned from the 1925 German Census and Electoral Data on small communities. From a reading of the assessment and interpretation of these, it was possible to form an idea of the support base of the Nazi Party. An evaluation of the Nazi Party’s social support base revealed the following: 7% peasantry, 35% industrial workers, and 51% middle class. On the basis of this support base, the Nazi Party built its organisational skill, consolidated its local leadership, and honed its political propaganda and campaign. As a result, its vote share rose up to 35% in 1932 from 4% in 1928. What is compelling to note here about its middle-class support base is that, at this time, the German middle class was a ‘threatened class’ confronting depression, war, separation, and inflation in their daily lives. Consequently, their condition deteriorated from bad to worse. Such a middle class wanted to be protected by some powerful force which could work as a bulwark against further erosion of their life’s meaning. And they believed such protection could only come from the Nazi Party and its leadership. While this social analysis of the Nazi Party is revealing, it is important to remember here that the ‘threatened middle class’ of the then Germany was not the middle class that Aristotle had envisaged as capable of aiding the process of democracy and strengthening its foundation.
It is commonly believed that wherever there are wide regional diversities in terms of language, religion, and ethnicity, it is challenging for democracy to take root. Given the above conditions characterising India, it was assumed that democracy would not work and that India would fall apart. However, after independence, during the 1950s, the way our politics reared and nurtured democracy is an amazing narrative. It is often surmised that democracy is sustained in developed countries where the middle class is the pivot by virtue of its number and its level of education, aided by the spread of urbanisation and communication. If this is the impression, then it will be fascinating to find out the conducive conditions for democracy across the world, assuming that India is an exception. Relevant here also would be to consider democracy not as a monotonic concept but as a variable one, fluctuating between degrees of liberal democracy, illiberal democracy, electoral democracy/autocracy, and so on.
Across the world, globalisation has brought about unprecedented economic growth. Irrespective of whether one likes or dislikes globalisation, whether one calls oneself socialist or capitalist, the tremendous economic progress effected by globalisation is undeniable. In a recent report by the Brookings Institution (2023), it has been noted that during 1990-2020, poverty has declined so much that Sustainable Development Goals identified by UNDP earmarked for 2030 will register much higher rates of poverty decline than expected. At around the same time, Pew Research in one of its findings has observed a significant rise of the middle class worldwide. In 2011, the middle class was 899 million strong, which today has expanded to 1.34 billion. This astounding expansion raises hopes for strengthening democracy. Or does it?
When we turn our lens on democracy, we find the impact of globalisation on democracy has been negative. For at the peak of the development curve, in most cases, democracy has been abandoned. In many countries, as freedoms are restricted and liberal values condemned, there is a noticeable reemergence of nationalism. An obscurantist, intolerant wave seems to be replacing democratic waves. In the present century, nationalism and democracy have become irreconcilable ideas. This trend is visible practically all over the world, from the USA to the Philippines. One is in a dilemma as to how to explain and comprehend this trend. That is why the currency of such terms as “democratic deficit,” “illiberal democracy,” “electoral autocracy” has become part of contemporary political science vocabulary. It has become increasingly challenging to reconcile the deterioration of democracy on the one hand, and the economic progress and expansion of the middle class on the other.
I do not know how to explain this phenomenon. The responsibility of offering any explanation for this, I believe, should rest on those who are currently engaged in the study and investigation of political ideas and practices, those who observe political processes and will do so for quite some time to come, that is, the younger generation of scholars. On this issue, I have a few critical questions which I wish to share here: what are the determinants of political ideas, political behaviour, electoral choices? Is social class the primary determinant? Or is it tradition and culture? Can we talk about stronger and weaker determinants? How to identify a ‘threatened’ middle class as contrasted with a normal one?
American sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset, whose prolific writings on democracy are well known, believed at the outset that ‘social class’ primarily determined political choices. Subsequently, however, he realised that tradition and culture were bigger determinants. In the Indian context, a critical look at the issue is particularly salient for the present and the future.
Second, the ‘middle class’ we have alluded to earlier is very vital in understanding the reach and spread of democracy. This middle class is a vast category which can be further subdivided as ‘upper middle class’, ‘middle middle class’, ‘lower middle class’. When we peruse the data (Brookings Institution, Pew Research) indicating the expansion of the ‘middle class’, we need to ask what is the definition of the ‘middle class’ that has expanded the most. In my understanding, a ‘middle class’ is one that is educated, has a stable income, and has the ability to consume (i.e., participate in the market contributing to expansion in demand). Now the question is, has THIS ‘middle class’ expanded or has it contracted? It is increasingly becoming difficult to arrive at any plausible conclusion given the kind of occupational structure of the middle class prevailing all over the world as well as in our country. Hence, a vigorous and robust analysis of the ‘middle class’ is critical to our understanding of today’s democracy. Only then is it possible to measure the success or future of democracy. At the same time, however, certain social aspects are also affecting the middle class. Globally, there seems to be a widespread restlessness around issues like religion, ethnicity, language, immigration, etc. Here, the reality of a ‘threatened middle class’ must be borne in mind. It is useful to remember that the phrase ‘economic progress’ is used in a very general sense. On the reverse of this ‘economic progress’ is starkly evident the rise of economic inequality. What then is the equation between the two? Does a large part of the middle class continue to feel ‘threatened’ in the face of a situation whose complexity they can neither understand nor resolve?
Third is the issue of ‘party identification’. While it is normal to identify ourselves with any particular party, it is important to find out the causes of its stability or instability. Often party identification is generationally inherited and this is a worldwide experience. For instance, in America, Democratic and Republican politicians generally come from Democratic and Republican families. The same is true for India too. So, it may be concluded that there is ‘stability’ in party identification. But it is also quite common today to find politicians effortlessly straddling different political parties in the span of their political careers, indeed more in India than in the United States or UK. It is frequently seen that political representatives leave the party on whose ticket they have been elected. For example, in India, a politician may be in the Congress Party for five years, then three years as a BJP member before returning to the Congress again. Hence it naturally begs the question, what then is the nature of party identification or the nature of party loyalty? Is there anything at all called ‘stability’ in party identification? In West Bengal, the Left Front at one time used to garner 50% of the popular votes. Today it has a very negligible presence (around five per cent electoral support) in Bengal politics. The moot point here is to ask, where has this vote (for CPI-M) gone and to whom has it gone and by what logic? How then do we understand or explain party identification? According to the Rational Choice Theory, every individual is essentially and totally selfish — self-interest drives all his/her decisions. Politicians are inevitably opportunistic. But, can this be the only explanation? Or is there any other way to comprehend this? This is a troublesome question that needs to be addressed.
Fourth, the space for open, spontaneous political debate has considerably shrunk in democracies in recent times. It is possible to identify the role of a particular type of ‘nationalism’ for this. But how far it is fruitful to engage with the idea of nationalism or with any other aspect of the nation-state needs to be carefully studied. I recollect that at the end of the 1990s, Professor Eric Hobsbawm, eminent British historian, had written that the ethnic cleansing that followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia would probably mark the end of our fascination with nationalism for good by imparting wisdom about the perils of nationalism.
But surprisingly, the 21st century witnessed the reemergence of nationalism as a global phenomenon. It is significant to examine the cause for its reemergence. In India, nationalism has always been a controversial and uncomfortable idea, at least amongst some of our thought leaders. Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay did not accept the Western concept of nationalism, had severe objections to it, and criticised it through his writings. Rabindranath Tagore rejected the notion of nationalism and considered universal humanism as a more valued idea. Swami Vivekananda too expressed his reservations on the concept. He was not one to believe in or acquiesce with the guardianship of the nation over the individual. Since Gandhi was leading a nationalist freedom movement, it may be understandable why he had to defend nationalism to some extent. Grave differences between Tagore and Gandhi on the issue of nationalism are well documented. Gandhi had conceded to Tagore that nationalism is not the ultimate goal; internationalism and humanism are the ultimate goals. Like in most other countries in today’s India, there has been a reemergence of nationalism which leaves no space for debates and disagreements. The irreconcilability of such nationalism with the idea of democracy is obvious. Yet it is necessary to find ways for reconciling them to preserve the social fabric.